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tudents of public policy have long been interested in redistribu-
tion. Especially in a political system permitting some degree of
decentralization, the question often becomes which level of gov-
ernment should assist the poor (Ladd and Doolittle 1982). Economic
theory favors the national government, with its broader geographic
scope and more progressive tax system. Yet many argue that the states
are closer to local problems and thus best suited to reallocate financial
resources. Although a growing body of research has begun to address
this issue (see, for example, Dye and Hurley 1978; Rafter 1985; Stephens
and Olson 1981; Ward 1981), very little appears comparing the rela-
tive targeting effectiveness of the national government and the states in
the area of aid to local public schools. The purpose here is to help fill
this research gap by comparing state and federal targeting of
intergovernmental assistance to a large number of local school districts
across the United States.
We begin by considering the theoretical issues surrounding redis-
tribution or targeting. Then we briefly review some of the empirical
findings that compare federal and state targeting. The analysis pro-
ceeds in several stages. First, we examine the extent to which
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1 Strictly speaking, redistribution and targeting are not synonymous, although they
obviously are closely related. Redistribution requires a Robin Hood effect; tar-
geting, on the other hand, says nothing about the source of the funds that are to
be allocated on the basis of need. In effect, targeting is a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for redistribution. Yet, we think the two terms are similar enough
to justify using them synonymously.
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intergovernmental aid is enrollment-driven. Second, we examine the
results of an analysis of enrollment influences in individual states. The
findings from this exercise lead to the final step, an examination of the
concentration on socioeconomic and fiscal needs in a subset of better-
targeting states.
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE TARGETING OF GRANTS-IN-AID
The issue of who should help needy local schools might be seen as
part of a larger debate over the appropriate division of responsibilities
within the U.S. federal system. According to considerable economic
and political theory, the national government is better positioned to
pursue redistributive policies than state and local governments. Pre-
sumably, the central government, with its inclusive geographic scope,
can undertake redistributive policies with less risk than can state or
local jurisdictions (see Oates 1972: ch. 1). Localities have special dif-
ficulties in dealing with economic and social conditions that sprawl
across jurisdictional boundaries. So Peterson (1981: 68-71) urges local
governments to eschew redistributive efforts and instead to adopt pol-
icies that will enhance the economic base and productive potential of
the community. Otherwise, the permeability of local government bound-
aries and mobility of capital leaves these units unduly vulnerable to
loss of mobile citizenry who generally belong to the revenue-producing
segment of the population (David and Kantor 1983: 293). The central
government thus inherits the responsibility for redistribution almost
by default.
Despite the theoretical argument for federal targeting, other liter-
ature offers two notable reasons why the national government may do
poorly at redistribution. First is what Downs (1980: 530) calls the &dquo;law
of political dispersion.&dquo; In a democratic system based on single-member
districts, politicians must spread the benefits of public policy to con-
struct and maintain governing coalitions and to ensure reelection. The
compulsion to disperse benefits widely, often referred to as universal-
ism, tends to make all jurisdictions eligible for grant programs, reduc-
ing if not eliminating any potential for targeting. Second, Congress’s
commitment to a wide dispersal of benefits has been facilitated, at
least until recently, by the absence of effective budgetary constraints
(Stein and Hamm 1987).
Research on the targeting of federal funds yields a mixed picture.
Despite the theoretical rationale for redistribution, most federal grants
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are driven by population not local need (Copeland and Meier 1984).
There are exceptions, of course. Project grants leave some discretion
in the hands of federal administrators, which may allow concentration
of funds on needy people or needy areas (Anagnoson 1980: 235). And,
certain substantive programs seem more amenable to targeting than
others. The now defunct Urban Development Action Grants did a rel-
atively good job of targeting funds on the most distressed communities
(Rich 1982). Studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1990)
also show that federal revenue sharing reduced local fiscal disparities
more than did state aid programs. Under certain conditions, then,
federal programs may achieve some modest degree of targeting.
In the field of public education, where its financial support has
been minimal, the federal government has been able to offer funding
packages with fairly limited purposes. Thus a number of federal cate-
gorical grants have been aimed at special groups. Of these, the largest
has been Chapter I (formerly Title 1) of the Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act of 1965, which funds compensatory education for
children from low-income families (Tsang and Levin 1983: 352).
Timpane (1978: 2) estimated that about 56 percent of federal expen-
ditures for elementary and secondary schools for 1976 were for pro-
grams targeted to disadvantaged groups. But, a number of federal
formula-based education grants do not target on the basis of social,
economic, or fiscal hardship, e.g., grants for vocational and technical
training and for educating the handicapped. So federal aid to educa-
tion is not purely redistributive either by intent or practice.
What does research show regarding targeting by the states? Per-
haps state policymakers, being closer to local problems, may be more
responsive to local needs. Warren (1981: 31) also suggests that com-
munities within a given state are more homogeneous than localities
scattered across the nation, thus making it easier for state policymak-
ers to design need-based formulas to guide aid allocation decisions.
Some studies do show that states target their aid to local governments
and may do so more effectively than the federal government (Dye and
Hurley 1978; Stephens and Olson 1981). For example, pooled analy-
ses of the states have shown them to provide somewhat greater aid to
cities with more social, economic, or fiscal need (Pelissero 1984, 1985;
Stein 1981). But perhaps education is different. Even though state
school formulas are closely tied to district enrollments, states have a
long history of attempts to increase targeting to districts of special
need. Still, states have a long history of attempts to reduce inequities
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in school funding. The results have been mixed, even though during
the 1970s, 28 states modified their funding formulas to weaken the
traditional nexus between dollars and pupils and to provide more
money for the disadvantaged (Fuhrman 1982). So some states appar-
ently do respond to school district need (Morgan and Pelissero 1989;
Pelissero and Morgan 1987). Most of the research on state aid, how-
ever, does not offer separate analyses within individual states (an excep-
tion is Stein and Hamm 1987). Thus, the degree of targeting observed
on the part of all states might be largely the result of the redistributive
actions of just a few.
A final qualification: we must acknowledge that some federal or
state programs may be more likely than others to reach districts with
special requirements. But with an analysis of all districts in all states,
it is not possible to disaggregate aid totals.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Based on the above theory, our research expectations are as
follows:
1. Enrollment will be the main determinant of both state and fed-
eral aid to independent school districts but will be an especially pow-
erful force for states.
2. Federal aid per pupil will be better targeted to disadvantaged
districts than will state aid.
3. State targeting will be a feature of aid systems in only a small
number of states.
The analysis includes virtually the universe of U. S. independent
school districts. Forty-five states have independent school districts; the
parent government provides nearly all local school support in Hawaii,
while Alaska, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have no inde-
pendent school districts (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983: 17). Also,
the analysis will exclude Rhode Island, with only three independent
school districts. The final number of districts included in the study
was 13,655 (higher education districts were excluded). We chose the
period 1982 because of the availability of a Census of Governments
report in that year and its close proximity to the collection of targeting
indicators during the 1980 census. The 1982 data also provide the
opportunity to examine the effects of state targeting that were an
expected consequence of the educational finance reforms put in place
by a number of states during the 1970s.
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The dependent variables for our study are federal aid (aggregate and
per pupil) and state aid (aggregate and per pupil) to independent
school districts in 1982.2 These data are from the 1982 Census of
Governments.3 The choices for independent variables are modeled after the
Stein and Hamm (1987) study of the universe of U.S. municipal gov-
ernments. We first employ enrollment itself as a variable in an aggre-
gate analysis of both federal and state aid in 1982. This allows us to
examine initially the linkage between total intergovernmental aid from
the federal or state governments and the number of pupils in the sys-
tems. The indicators of targeting are drawn from the 1980 census (by
school district) and the Census of Governments. Three measures of need
tap different aspects of socioeconomic problems in the school districts.
Like Stein and Hamm (1987), we will use a district’s per capita income
as a predictor of aid. But we have added two key social targeting mea-
sures to the analysis: the proportion of the school district that is black
and the percentage of indigent families with children in the school
district.4 The two remaining targeting measures are indicators of the
independent school districts’ fiscal health. A fiscal effort measure has
been constructed by taking a school district’s total revenue from own
sources (exclusive of tuition and fees) and dividing it by enrollment.
The second fiscal variable taps the debt burden of the school district.
We operationalize debt as the amount of annual debt interest divided
by enrollment, or debt (interest) per pupil for each school district. If
targeting occurs, we expect federal or state aid per pupil to be posi-
tively related to the proportion of black and poor families in the dis-
trict and to the size of the debt burden. Further, we expect well-
targeted systems to show a negative relationship between aid and both
per capita income and revenue per pupil.
FINDINGS
We consider the effects of federal aid first. Table 1 presents two
models of federal aid to over 13,000 independent school districts for
2 Some nominally state funds actually represent federal pass-through aid. The Advi-
sory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1980: 9) reports that net federal
assistance (including pass-through) is about 17 percent of total intergovernmental
aid to local education (for 1977). The national government directly supplies less
than 2 percent of local school funding (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990: 7). The
data available for this research include only direct federal aid.
3 These data were provided by Robert M. Stein, Rice University.
4 Data on each of these socioeconomic measures are drawn from the 1980 Census, by
school district, as reported by the National Center for Education Statistics.
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fiscal year 1982. The first equation, column 1, shows how much dis-
trict enrollment alone affects total dollars of federal aid. Enrollment
has a very strong and significant impact on federal aid, reflected in the
beta of .62. In this equation, 38 percent of total federal aid can be
explained by enrollment alone. In a subsequent model (not shown) we
included the other need variables in the equation but they contributed
virtually nothing to explained variance, as the adjusted R2 remained
at .38. Because the need measures do not register in this assessment of
total aid, it might be useful to transform the dependent variable. The
aid literature reveals some disagreement over this issue, however. The
most common approach is to use per capita figures, primarily to avoid
what Dye and Hurley (1981) call the &dquo;so what&dquo; effect, that large juris-
dictions receive the most money. Several studies take a different view,
that an analysis using per capita figures may produce misleading results
(Ward 1981), or that decision makers are more likely to think of total
dollars rather than in per capita terms (Anton, Cawley, and Kramer,
1980: 104). The position one takes depends primarily on what the
researcher wishes to show. We elect to use per pupil measures in most
of this analysis because the results, especially with the state aid equa-
tions, are more interpretable and intuitively pleasing. We should note,
however, that enrollment was tried as a predictor of federal per pupil
aid but could account for none of the variation in this measure and is
not used in the analysis shown in column 2 of Table 1.5
Column 2 offers a model of federal aid per pupil that includes the
key measures of socioeconomic and fiscal need. Again, we expect that
federal aid per pupil will be positively related to the proportion of
blacks and poor children and size of district debt, and negatively
related to per capita income and district own source revenues. This
model of federal aid per pupil is quite weak, however. Only two pre-
dictors are significant and in the expected direction. Specifically, fed-
eral aid is very modestly targeted to school districts with larger pro-
portions of children from poverty families (beta = .11) and lower per
5 We also examined a model of total federal (and, in a later analysis, state) aid using
aggregate need measures, but the level of intercorrelation between predictors was
too high to use these as a comparison to the per pupil results reported here.
6 It may be worth noting that the simple correlations between total enrollment and the
social need measures were: total number of blacks in district, r = .82, total
number of poor families with children, r = .92. The multicollinearity between
these measures and enrollment was another reason not to include enrollment in
the equation.
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TABLE 1
FEDERAL AND STATE AID TO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICTS, ALTERNATIVE
REGRESSION MODELS, 1982
*p < .05 **p < .01
(Figures in parentheses are unstandardized regression coefficients)
capita incomes (beta = -.06). Own source revenue and debt have no
impact in this model, while the proportion of blacks in the district has
a weak and inverse relationship to targeted aid. Overall, only 2 per-
cent of the variation in per pupil federal aid is explained with this
model.
Next we consider the models of state aid. Table 1 also shows the
equations predicting state transfer payments using enrollment and the
selected indicators of district need. If one looks first at the total dollars
of state aid (column 3), the immense power of enrollment alone is
obvious. Enrollment has a beta value of .97 and this model shows that
enrollment accounts for 93 percent of the variation in total state aid in
1982. So in the aggregate, 93 percent of all state funds for public
schools across the country can be accounted for by enrollment alone.
Again, the need variables can add nothing to explaining total state
aid. We also checked to see if total school population can account for
variation in state dollars per pupil and found that it does not. This
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nonrelationship suggests the possibility that some targeting might be
going on. The final model in column 4 tests that assumption. Indeed,
school districts with higher proportions of black residents and lower
per capita incomes receive more state funds per pupil. But this evi-
dence of targeting is offset by some nontargeting relationships. Higher
own source revenues per pupil is a significant determinant of per pupil
aid, contrary to our expectation. Overall, the pooled analysis model
accounts for 11 percent of the variation in state aid per pupil.
Questions could be raised about the analysis being sensitive to the
effects of a few very large or very small school districts in the data set.
Hypothetically, a few outliers could skew the results. To check this
possibility, we divided the districts into four enrollment groups and
used model three (Table 1) to determine if state targeting might vary
by district size. In general, the pooled analysis shows that targeting is
better in larger districts.’ 7
As suggested above, some state educational funding systems may
be much less enrollment-driven than others. If so, a pooled analysis
may be subject to the effects produced by just a few good or poor
targeting states. To investigate this possibility, we performed separate
regressions for each state, treating the school districts of each state as
part of a system with its own unique distribution characteristics. We
initially assessed the linkage between a state’s total aid to schools and
district enrollment for the 44 states delineated above. The regression
results showed that in 28 of the 44 states, total aid was allocated nearly
exclusively on the basis of enrollment. In these states8 nearly all state
education funding (98 to 99 percent) was based on enrollment. Another
six states (KS, MI, NM, NY, OH, SD) allocated 90 to 97 percent of
aid on that basis. School aid in the remaining 10 states (CT, ME,
MA, MO, MT, NH, NJ, TN, VT, WY), many found in the North-
east, was somewhat less predicted by enrollment alone (70 to 89 per-
7 The model accounts for just 12 percent of variance for districts of less than 1,000
students but reaches 32 percent for the largest jurisdictions. In three larger
enrollment groups (1,000-4,999, 5,000-9,999, 10,000 + students) proper target-
ing is apparent to districts with lower own source funds, higher proportions of
children from poor families, and higher debt burdens per pupil. The relative size
of the black population in these districts has little or no effect in the models. And
the smallest schools (less than 1,000) reflect only one weak targeted relationship
(income). Regression models for federal aid per pupil with the five predictors
across the four enrollment categories generally showed little difference.
8 The states included AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA,
MS, NE, NV, NM, ND, OK, OR, PA, SC, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
993
cent). The 16 states that do not allocate aid exclusively on the basis of
district enrollment are worth more detailed study.
As the final step, we conduct a within state analysis for the 16
&dquo;better&dquo; targeting states, using per pupil aid as the dependent variable.
The results of this exercise appear in Table 2. The multiple regression
equations reveal that among these states, a few represent good fits to
our model. The explained variance ranges from a low of 0 percent for
Tennessee to a high of 98 percent in Montana. (The Montana results
are almost exclusively attributable to one nontargeted predictor, own
source revenue, and as such it is clearly a deviant case). Perhaps more
important than the overall predictive capacity of the model is the vari-
ability among the states in their response to need variables.
None of the states react to all five indicators of need. Maine and
New York are the most responsive states, with significant targeting
relationships for four of the five predictors. In each of these states, the
only nonsignificant predictor is proportion of poor children, although
it is in the targeted direction. Excluding Montana, we find that Maine
and New York stand out as the best targeting states with explained
variances of 45 and 49 percent, respectively. Four states - Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, and Ohio - respond to three indicators of need.
Each is somewhat special in its targeting predictors, although the range
of explained variance is similar (21 to 37 percent). Four more-Kansas,
Massachusetts, Montana, and ~ermont - concentrate on just two mea-
sures of need. Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyo-
ming show significant targeting relationships with one need indicator,
while Connecticut and Tennessee target none of our measures. And
what of socioeconomic versus fiscal targeting by these states? While 10
states respond significantly to socioeconomic indicators (i.e., blacks,
poor children, income), 11 states target fiscal need (i.e., lower reve-
nues, higher debt). We might note, though, that unlike the case for the
social or economic measures, several of the significant fiscal variables
are in the wrong direction (for own revenue- Minnesota, Montana;
for debt-South Dakota).9 Only five states target to greater minority
population; four of these have sizable black populations. And only four
states provide proportionately more funding to districts with higher
9 In these two anomalous states, Minnesota and Montana, districts that raise larger
sums of money on their own are rewarded with more state funding. This arrange-
ment bears a resemblance to the funding formula for the now defunct federal
General Revenue Sharing program, which included tax effort as one of its three
equally-weighted components.
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percentages of poor families with children. In sum, better targeting
than expected is found among these 16 states, but more effort goes to
meet the needs of economically or fiscally strapped districts than to
those with greater social need. But in general we confirm our expecta-
tion that the apparent targeting of school aid among all states is sub-
stantially affected by the actions of a handful of better targeting systems.
CONCLUSION
This research shows that federal and state total dollar allocations
to public schools are prominently affected by enrollments, especially
state aid. When intergovernmental school allocations are converted to
per capita amounts, however, the effect of enrollment vanishes. Still,
the analysis shows that neither government engages in much targeting
to the social, economic, or fiscal needs of recipient districts. What then
are we to make of the various theories about how political systems
allocate aid dollars? One prominent position in the economics litera-
ture suggests that if any redistribution is to occur in a decentralized
political system, it must come from the central government. Yet, con-
trary to our expectations, we found little evidence of federal targeting
of school funds. With the data available, we are unable to offer any
reasonable explanation for the allocation of the federal education dollar.
Another well-accepted theoretical perspective indicates that little tar-
geting of intergovernmental aid is likely because the &dquo;law of political
dispersion&dquo; compels lawmakers to spread funds as widely as possible.
This research cannot definitively confirm either of these differing
viewpoints regarding how aid is allocated. For education grants, espe-
cially those from the state, enrollment remains the dominant factor in
allocation formulas. Is this sufficient to accept the argument that most
school aid is driven by universalistic allocation practices? We think the
answer is yes. Aggregate data preclude a knowledge of decision-maker
motives. But when dollars closely track people, universalism seems the
most plausible explanation. Yet, when we examined state aid more
closely by considering individual states separately, a somewhat differ-
ent picture appeared. Some 16 states did seem to direct some of their
school aid to needy districts.
What makes these states good targeters? Could it be that they have
crafted educational funding systems emphasizing equalization? Not
necessarily. In 1982, seven of these states funded most basic school
programs through an equalization formula. But the other nine states
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used a foundation or general aid appropriation for the bulk of public
school assistance. Interviews with state school finance officials in six of
the best targeting states (from Table 2),10 revealed that in most cases
considerable targeting was intended by the states’ distribution formu-
las. For example, Maine considers a school district’s fiscal capacity in
its foundation program formula and awards aid inversely to districts’
real property values. Maine also subsidizes debt service - one of the
few states to consider a local district’s ability to pay debt. Michigan’s
formula provides that most state aid is to be distributed inversely to
local revenue effort and property wealth. Districts with high mileage
rates and low property values will receive more funding. Missouri is
one of the few states to target aid to needy children rather than needy
districts. Although its formula tends to reward wealthy districts with
larger numbers of children, the distribution system does require an
additional appropriation of state aid for each AFDC child in a district.
Until 1990 reforms, New Jersey used an equalization program designed
to award more money to schools with lower equalized property values.
New York’s system is pulled by the demands of the New York City
schools, but 60 percent of state operating aid is distributed inversely to
district wealth. Among our top six targeters, only Ohio appears to be
passive in providing more aid to needier schools. The state’s formula is
designed to give more aid to larger, urban districts. Therefore, it is
likely that the states’ targeting effectiveness is an artifact of larger dis-
tricts, which clearly have more needy children and less wealthy prop-
erty values, receiving most of the aid from state government.
The interview data essentially confirm the statistical results. The
better targeting states are those with a legal plan to distribute more
money to needier school districts or to districts with larger numbers of
needy children. Perhaps other states could examine the distribution
system in Maine or Michigan or even New York and find effective
strategies for enhanced targeting capacity. Although such schemes may
not always be popular politically, a few states are setting an example
of good targeting both for other states and for the national government
in the area of public school assistance.
10 State school finance or school administration officials in Maine, Michigan, Mis-
souri, New York, New Jersey, and Ohio were interviewed by telephone in July
1991. Reports from several of these states were also examined to understand a
state’s distribution system.
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